On 9 October the United States took an unprecedented step: it designated the International Criminal Court itself for sanctions. Previous measures had targeted judges and prosecutors. The new action is directed at the institution created by 125 states to investigate genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression when national systems cannot or will not genuinely act.
The immediate effect has been softened by American licences allowing some transactions to continue. One provides a 180-day period for activities needed to maintain the Court’s operations; others cover telecommunications and business software, pensions and matters involving ICC detainees. This is important, but it should not be mistaken for a retreat. The threat has been postponed, not removed.
The sovereignty objection is real
The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and has long objected to the Court claiming jurisdiction over American citizens without American consent. That argument cannot simply be dismissed as hostility to justice. International courts exercise powers delegated by treaties, and their jurisdiction, procedures and evidence should be open to rigorous legal challenge.
The ICC is also imperfect. It has been criticised for slow proceedings, limited resources, uneven enforcement and an early concentration on African cases. It has no police force and depends upon states to arrest suspects. Some governments celebrate its warrants when directed at an opponent and denounce the same institution when scrutiny turns towards an ally.
Those weaknesses make reform and consistent scrutiny necessary. They do not justify disabling the Court through financial power. The Rome Statute already incorporates the principle of complementarity: national courts have the first responsibility to investigate and prosecute, while the ICC acts where a state is unwilling or unable genuinely to do so. Disputes over jurisdiction should be argued before judges and through diplomacy among states, not settled by cutting a court off from banking and technology.
Sanctions turn power into a verdict
American sanctions matter far beyond the United States. The international financial system relies heavily on the dollar. Software, cloud services, insurers, banks and professional advisers may withdraw rather than risk penalties. Even companies outside America can decide that serving the Court is commercially dangerous. A legal institution can therefore be weakened without a judgment ever being overturned.
This is the central issue. The United States is entitled to criticise the ICC, refuse membership and contest particular decisions. It is not entitled to demand that other treaty members abandon an institution they lawfully created. If the independence of a court depends upon whether its cases satisfy the most powerful government, it is not independent.
The same principle applies consistently. Russia should not be able to intimidate investigators examining crimes in Ukraine. Israel and Hamas should not be exempt from investigation into alleged crimes arising from 7 October and the war in Gaza. American, European or African officials should not receive immunity merely because their governments possess greater diplomatic or economic leverage. International law cannot mean accountability for enemies and discretion for friends.
Europe must provide more than a statement
The European Union has reaffirmed its support for the Court and said it is ready to take the measures necessary to protect its operations. Britain joined Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Denmark and the Netherlands in opposing the sanctions. The six-month licence creates space for negotiation, but it also creates a deadline.
Europe should use that time to make the ICC operationally resilient. This means examining whether the EU Blocking Statute can protect European firms, establishing reliable euro payment channels, safeguarding access to software and communications, protecting staff and cooperating organisations, and ensuring that temporary disruption does not stop investigations or support for victims. These arrangements should be prepared even while diplomats seek reversal of the American decision.
Protection should not become exemption from criticism. European states should press the Court to improve case management, transparency, geographical balance and the speed with which it reaches decisions. Defending judicial independence and demanding better performance are compatible positions. Indeed, a court protected from political coercion must be held more firmly to legal and administrative standards.
The United Kingdom must turn support into action
The United Kingdom has particular responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a close ally of the United States and a State Party to the Rome Statute. It has also incorporated cooperation with the Court into domestic law through the International Criminal Court Act 2001. Its support for the ICC should therefore extend beyond joining statements of concern.
Before the 180-day licence expires, the Government should use its influence in Washington to seek the withdrawal or substantial limitation of the sanctions. The Foreign Office and Treasury should also assess how UK banks, software providers, insurers and professional advisers could continue lawfully supporting the Court. Where necessary, ministers should provide clear guidance, appropriate licences or legal protections so that uncertainty does not cause British firms to withdraw services unnecessarily. The UK should also work with other States Parties on alternative payment systems, secure communications and additional financial support for the Court.
This defence of judicial independence should be accompanied by demands for greater efficiency, transparency and consistency from the ICC. Britain should insist that investigations respect due process and apply the same legal standards regardless of the nationality or alliances of the accused. The Court’s authority must rest on law, evidence and fair procedure—but the Government’s commitment to international law will be measured by whether it protects those principles when doing so carries a diplomatic or economic cost. Six months is not a reprieve. It is a deadline for action.
Sources
- US Treasury, International Criminal Court-related sanctions and general licences, 9 October 2026.
- International Criminal Court response to US sanctions, 9 October 2026.
- European Union statement supporting the ICC, 10 October 2026.
- Reuters: international reaction to the US sanctions, 9 October 2026.
- UK Government joint statement supporting the ICC, 9 October 2026.
